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1. Introduction 
Bank regulation and supervision has been the subject of much recent debate and attention due 
to the devastating effects of the global financial crisis. As the role of banking sector is undoubtedly 
indispensable in the process of financial intermediation and thereby achieving faster economic growth 
and sustainable development, a prudent regulatory environment can not only facilitate performance of 
the banking systems but also ensure financial stability. The crisis has forced the regulators and 
researchers to re-examine our understanding of the characteristics of financial markets and financial 
institutions. The financial crisis has revealed the limitations in supervisory enforcement and market 
discipline underscoring the importance of combining strong, timely, and anticipatory supervisory 
enforcement with better use of market discipline. Some micro-prudential regulations were poorly 
designed, contributing to systemic risk. It also highlighted the importance of basics — solid, 
transparent, legal and institutional frameworks to promote financial stability as well as building 
supervisory capacity on priority. The crisis has triggered a healthy debate on approaches to regulation 
and supervision among regulators, policy makers, and academics, leading to multiple proposals for 
further reforms. Reforms are necessitated to aim at limiting regulatory arbitrage, more transparency 
and simpler regulation to enhance accountability, more proactive efforts to identify and address 
incentive problems and make better use of regulatory resources. As financial regulators around the 
world endeavor to decide how best to reform bank regulation and supervision, an essential input ought 
to be a thorough understanding of what other countries do and eventually of the implications of these 
choices.  
Though several studies have pointed to weaknesses in regulation and supervision as one of 
the factors leading to the crisis (Gonzalez, 2005; Dan, 2010; Lau, 2010; Levine, 2010; Merrouche and 
Neir, 2010; and Barth et al., 2012), not only did the crisis raise important questions on the 
appropriateness of the regulatory and supervisory approaches pursued in the run-up to the crisis, but 
also it prompted regulators to consider important changes in regulation and supervision. It is widely 
believed that the epicenter of the crisis was in the developed countries but the contagion was seen 
even in the emerging and developing economies. This underscores the need to examine the recent 
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state of bank regulation and supervision in a wide range of countries and to compare it to the pre-
crisis situation.  
This paper builds on the kind of studies that have examined the Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey (BRSS). Barth et al., (2004) assess the relationship between specific regulatory 
and supervisory practices and banking-sector development, efficiency, and fragility suggest that 
regulatory and supervisory practices that force accurate information disclosure to empower private-
sector monitoring of banks and create incentives for private agents to monitor banks work best to 
promote bank performance and stability. Barth et al., (2006) reveal that restrictions on the entry of 
banks, government ownership of banks, and restrictions on bank activities hurt banking system 
performance. Further on, Barth et al., (2008) conclude that while many countries strengthened capital 
regulations and official supervisory agencies following Basel guidelines, the reforms are not likely to 
improve bank stability or efficiency. 
The foregoing assay suggests the motivation to make a critical analysis of the regulatory 
environments in general and BRICS
1
 countries in particular. Notwithstanding the high degree of 
interest in the topic and extensive work on the global regulatory framework, there is a need to 
examine the information on the regulatory and supervisory approaches pursued across the countries 
and the changes brought about by the crisis. This entails to find answers for three essential questions: 
First, what was the topography of the regulatory and supervisory frameworks of countries that were 
directly hit by the global financial crisis? Second, how did they differ from those of the BRICS 
countries? Third, what lessons can be drawn for strengthening the regulatory structures of these 
countries? Furthermore, it is also desirable to trace how the national regulatory and supervisory 
practices changed since the previous survey in response to the global financial crisis. In addition, an 
analysis of the relationship between bank performance and stability with differences in bank 
regulations and supervision in BRICS countries and that of the advanced countries merits an attention. 
 
                                                          
1 BRICS countries assume significance as these five (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) emerging economies host more than 2.8 
billion people or 40 percent of the world‘s population, cover more than a quarter of the world‘s land area over three continents, and account 
for more than 25 percent of global GDP. The five BRICS countries are distinguished from a host of other promising emerging markets by 
their demographic and economic potential to rank among the world‘s largest and most influential economies in the 21st century. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the review of the 
related literature on bank regulation, supervision and efficiency. Section 3 describes the data 
employed for the analysis and the methodological design including the econometric approaches. 
Section 4 presents the results and the related discussion. We conclude in section 5. 
2. Related Literature  
Banks are considered fragile as they have high leverage ratios, fractional reserves and high 
potential for a run. This calls for a greater care in regulating the banks, as they are so sensitive and 
fragile (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). The twin goals of bank regulation and supervision are stability and 
efficiency of the financial system and often appear to pull in opposing directions. This has led to a 
raging debate on the nature and extent of the trade-off between the two. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002) and Beck et al., (2006) studied the effect of regulations on banking crises, and 
Pasiouras et al., (2006) and Demirguc-Kunt et al., (2008) have examined the effect of banking 
regulation on banks' overall soundness. Further, while Barth et al., (2004) have studied the effect of a 
broad range of regulatory and supervisory measures on bank stability at the international level, 
Gonzalez (2005) and Laeven and Levine (2009) have examined the banks' risk-taking behaviour. 
A good strand of literature on bank governance and regulation can be broadly analysed under 
two strands; first, exploring the unsystematic risk because of the internal variables as its potential 
determinants (Brewer et al., 1996; Gallo et al., 1996; Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Angbazo, 1997) 
and; the second, surveying the systematic risk due to the negative externalities in the financial 
markets, regulations and macro-economic conditions (Demirgunc-Kunt, 1989; Hassan et al., 1994). 
Both streams offer evidence of substantial correlations among the internal determinants, externalities 
and the bank risk. However, reviewing the banking regulation in the microeconomics perspectives 
authors such as Rochet (2002), Freixas and Santomero (2002), and Santos (2000) observe that 
regulation is not at its optimal level.  
Categorising banking regulation as micro-prudential and macro-prudential, Hanson et al., 
(2011) observe that micro-prudential regulation is one in which regulation itself is a partial 
equilibrium in its conception and aimed at preventing the costly miscarriage of individual financial 
institutions and macro-prudential approach is one that recognizes the general equilibrium effects and 
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strives to safeguard the financial system in entirety. Bank regulation is not only intended for fostering 
investor protection but also for enhancing efficiency of capital allocation for raising the efficacy of 
financial markets. Especially for emerging markets, the measurement used more often for regulating 
the banking industry include; reserve requirements, suspension of convertibility, deposits insurance 
and capital adequacy requirements (Eichberger and Harper, 1997). Emphasising the need for 
regulation towards safeguarding banking stability, Swamy (2013) observes that ensuring overall 
macroeconomic balance, enhancement in the macro-prudential functioning of institutions and 
markets, and reinforcement of micro-prudential institutional soundness through regulation and 
supervision need to be regularly undertaken. A more detailed debate of the formative papers in 
banking regulation can be obtained in Dewatripont and Tirole (1993), and Freixas and Rochet (1997). 
Conventional approaches to bank regulation underscore the positive features of capital 
adequacy requirements (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). Proclivity for banks to engage in risk-taking 
is curtailed with limited liability as against the higher levels of capital at risk. In this backdrop, capital 
adequacy obligations assume critical role in aligning the incentives for depositors, bondholders and 
other creditors (Berger et al., 1995, and Keeley and Furlong, 1990). However, on the contrary, Koehn 
and Santomero (1980) and Besanko and Kanatas (1996) contend that increases in capital requirements 
could escalate the banks‘ risk-taking behavior and would have perverse effects on banking. 
Quite a few notable theoretical considerations can be observed in understanding the risk-
taking behaviour of the banks. Risk-taking is an effect of the cause such as the ―conflict of interest‖ 
that may arise when banks diversify their activities (such as; insurance underwriting, real estate 
investment and securities underwriting, etc.) as they may dump such securities on ill-informed 
investors in order to help firms with outstanding loans (John et al., 1994, and Saunders, 1985). It is 
the factor of moral hazard that induces the risk-taking behaviour of the banks (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2002), as this would lead the banks to have more opportunities to engage itself in wide 
range of activities (Boyd et al., 2005). Merton (1977) was the first to quantify ―moral hazard‖ issue 
by relating the value of deposit insurance with that of a put option on the FDIC. In this regard, 
Pennacchi (2005) has evoked significant concerns of moral hazard as that induces the banks to invest 
in off-balance sheet portfolios with high systematic risk. Likewise, Bhattacharya et al., (1998) too 
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have held the view that government deposit insurance affects the behaviors of banks, which was 
further acknowledged by Bühler and Koziol (2004).  
 The belief that banks such as ―too big to fail‖ and ―too big to discipline‖ often give rise to 
reasoning that they wield considerable economic power and consequently political clout thereby 
leading to aggressive risk-taking behaviour. It is observed that on evolution over a period of years, 
banks have grown horizontally as well as vertically to such a complex extent that they are posing 
difficulties in monitoring too. ―Originate to distribute‖ (OTD) strategy quite obviously allows the 
global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) to originate risky loans and package 
them into asset backed securities (ABS) with structured tranches and subsequent repackaging them 
further as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) in upper level securitizations. Though, in the short 
run OTD strategy is quite attractive and convincing, in practical effect, in the long run, credit default 
swaps (CDS) and the synthetic CDOs engineered by G-SIFIs have resulted in multiple bets on the 
high-risk loans (Wilmarth, 2010). Given the theoretical setting there is a need to study the regulatory 
impact on the top five banks in the banking systems during the crisis period. 
 The ownership structure and the management behaviour influence the risk-taking behaviour 
of the banks. It is widely held that bank risk
2
 is dependent on each bank‘s ownership structure as 
standard agency theories advocate that bank risk-taking is influenced by ownership structure (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; John et al., 2008). Further, Galai and Masulis (1976) and Esty (1998) have found 
that diversified owners in the case of limited liability firms have incentives to increase bank risk 
taking tendency as they collect funds from depositors and bondholders. Correspondingly, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Kane (1985) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) have observed that managers with 
‗private benefits of control‘ over banks tend to resort for less risk-taking. In the light of these 
theoretical underpinnings, one testable prediction that can be supposed is that banks with an 
ownership structure that empowers diversified owners tend towards more risk-taking than those banks 
whose owners assume a more low-key governance role holding the other factors constant. Analysing 
the role of global financial crisis, Hale (2012) observes that it played an important role by shifting the 
                                                          
2 Walid and Eric (2010) have established a causal relationship between degree of internationalization  and performance, but find that the 
nature of this relationship varies by bank, and also depends upon the riskiness associated with each bank's foreign asset exposures. 
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center of network from developing to developed countries and by affecting the formation of new 
relationships by large banks, banks that are normally immune to the effects of local recessions and 
banking crises. Focusing on the role of corporate governance, Laeven and Levine (2009) state that 
banks‘ risk-taking is dependent on the corporate governance structure of the banks. In a detailed study 
of banking firms, providing evidence that stockholder-controlled banks embrace more risks than 
managerially controlled banks, Saunders, et al., (1990) have observed that management stock 
ownership induces their risk-taking behaviour. Further, John et al., (2000) in their seminal study on 
the theory of bank regulation and management compensation argue for a towering role for managerial 
compensation structures in bank regulation. In this backdrop, it is essential to study the impact of 
regulatory environment on the ownership structures during the crisis period. 
Banks experience risk due to macroeconomic outlook as slowdown in economic growth is 
tied with high inflation, soaring interest rates and depreciating currency (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998). On the other hand, Taylor (2009), Yellen (2009) and De Larosiere (2009) 
underscore the viewpoint that a free flow monetary policy leads to excess liquidity and consequent 
low interest rates leading to the burst of financial engineering and innovation which further amplify 
and accelerate the consequences of excess liquidity and rapid credit expansion ultimately resulting in 
asset bubbles. Suggesting how the relation between integration and synchronization depends on the 
type of shocks hitting the world economy, Kalemli‐Ozcan et al., (2013) show that shocks to global 
banks played an important role in triggering and spreading the global financial crisis. On the other 
hand, Maxwel and Gitman (1989) using cluster analysis as the analytical technique, found the 
evidence to support the existence of multiple classes of central banks that may insulate the 
international banking system from externally generated shocks. Further, it is the profit seeking 
behaviour of banks that are at the core of the Minskyan model of financial instability. Banks‘ rational 
profit-seeking behaviour in an uncertain decision-making environment extends them to pursue risk-
taking financial practices that give rise to a state of escalating financial fragility (Minsky, 1975, 1982 
and 1986). According to Yellen (2009), asset price bubbles are at the heart of Minsky‘s viewpoint on 
how financial meltdowns occur. It is the consideration of the imperfectness of financial markets, and 
more particularly the ―information asymmetries‖ is the source of financial instability or a crisis as is 
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established in Mishkin‘s approach (Mishkin 1999a and 1999b) that an upsurge in information 
asymmetry causes ex ante a compounding risk of adverse selection. As is observed in the recent past, 
perverse incentives to managers that exist in the banking industry persuade them to take on too much 
risk, which lead to crises (Davidson, 2010). 
The foregoing theoretical framework entails us to have thorough examination of the bank 
regulation/supervisory environment during the crisis period and figure out what was the topography of 
the regulatory and supervisory frameworks of countries that were directly hit by the global financial 
crisis vis-a-vis that of those countries that were not directly affected? In addition, it would be 
desirable to examine the regulatory environment in the case of the BRICS countries and find out 
whether they were quite different. In addition, an analysis of the relationship between bank 
performance and stability with differences in bank regulations and supervision in BRICS countries 
and that of the advanced countries merits an attention. What lessons can be drawn for strengthening 
the regulatory structures of these countries? Furthermore, there exists a scope to trace how the 
national regulatory and supervisory practices changed and kind of inferences could be drawn to build 
the regulatory literature in this domain. 
3. Data and Methodology 
We source the data from World Bank‘s Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS) 
data collected under their research program on Financial Institutions and Regulation. The BRSS, 
carried out by the World Bank, is a unique source of comparable worldwide data on how banks are 
regulated and supervised around the world. Including the current version of the survey database 
updated in 2012, and the earlier surveys, released in 2001, 2003, and 2007, in all, four databases are 
explored for the analysis of this study. The 2012 survey
3
 database provides information on bank 
regulation and supervision for 143 jurisdictions. It covers data since 2008, and is therefore quite 
useful in scrutinizing the state of bank regulation and supervision in the focus countries of this study 
and comparing it to the pre-crisis situation. For the analysis, we consider 30 countries that are 
                                                          
3 The World Bank‘s BRSS survey of 2011-12 provides data for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 for 143 countries of which 37 are advanced 
and 106 are emerging and developing economies and provides a balanced representation of countries in terms of level of income and 
population size. In terms of topical coverage, the survey is quite comprehensive, providing a unique and valuable set of information on a 
wide range of issues related to bank regulation and supervision. It contains over 270 questions, some with sub-questions covering about 630 
features of bank regulation and supervision 
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significant in terms of their geo-economic significance, exposure to crisis and the nature of their 
banking & financial systems. These include fifteen countries directly affected by crisis (systemic and 
borderline cases) and fifteen of those indirectly affected by contagion. Amongst them are included the 
BRICS countries for a differentiated focus of the study. In all, these thirty countries considered under 
this study cover more than 75 percent of global banking. We have classified the crisis-countries using 
the database developed by Laeven and Valencia (2010)
4
. We furnish in Table 1, the list of the 
countries included in this study.  
Table 1: List of countries covered in the study 
 
Sl. No.              Crisis-countries Countries indirectly affected by crisis 
 Advanced Emerging Advanced Emerging 
1 Cyprus   Argentina 
2 Denmark  Australia     
3 France   Brazil 
4 Germany  Canada  
5 Greece   China 
6 Ireland   Egypt 
7 Italy   India 
8 Netherlands   Indonesia 
9  Poland  Kuwait 
10 Portugal   Malaysia 
11  Russia  Mexico 
12 Spain  New Zealand  
13 Switzerland   Philippines 
14 
United 
Kingdom 
  South Africa 
15 United States   Thailand 
Notes: Countries of systemic cases with systemic banking crises are in bold font and the remaining with borderline cases are 
in regular font. Laeven and Valencia (2010) define systemic banking crises as cases where at least three of the listed 
interventions took place, and borderline cases are those that almost met their definition of a systemic crisis. Our classification 
of countries into advanced and emerging economies is influenced by the World Economic Outlook April 2011 of IMF (Table 
4.1: Economy groupings). BRICS Countries (as per World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013, IMF) are in italic. 
 
Not all the responses in the BRSS questionnaire are considered for analysis due to issues of 
comparability. We have considered only those significant responses on questions cover topics on 
which consistent cross-country data are already available, easily comparable and widely acceptable. 
On a detailed study of the four versions of World Bank‘s BRSS (i.e. released in 2000, 2003, 2007 and 
                                                          
4 Laeven and Valencia (2010) provide a new database of systemic banking crises for the period 1970-2009 building on earlier work by 
Caprio et al., (2005), Laeven and Valencia (2008), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). The update makes several improvements to the earlier 
database, including an improved definition of systemic banking crisis, the inclusion of crisis ending dates, and a broader coverage of crisis 
management policies. The database is the most up-to-date banking crisis database available. Table 1 in the paper provides the classification 
of countries for systemic banking crises, 2007-2009. 
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2012), we have grouped the select 51 responses to the questions in the survey into 10 variables viz. (i) 
entry, structure and competition; (ii) capital regime; (iii) asset classification norms; (iv) provisioning; 
(v) activities; (vi) protection to depositors; (vii) regulation of exposures; (viii) taxation; (ix) 
performance; and (x) supervision. We provide the description of the variables in Table 2.   
Table 2: Description of variables 
No. Variable Description of the Variables and Survey details about the variable 
1. 
Entry, 
structure and 
competition 
To explore this variable we study the responses of national supervisors for the select 
10 questions of the survey related to: entry norms for new banks; number of existing 
banks; asset concentration; government ownership and control; percent of the total 
foreign-owned bank assets in your domestic banking system; and applications for 
commercial banking licenses from domestic entities: received, denied, withdrawn and 
accepted. 
2. 
Capital 
Regime 
Under this capital regime variable we study the responses of national supervisors for 
the select 10 questions of the survey related to: minimum required risk-based 
regulatory capital ratio; actual risk based capital ratios; actual Tier 1 capital ratio; 
actual leverage ratio; variants of calculation of capital requirements; coverage of off-
balance sheet items in estimation of leverage ratio; and variants of calculating capital 
requirements for credit risk. 
3. 
Asset 
classification 
norms 
To study this asset classification norms variable we consider the responses of national 
supervisors for the select 5 questions of the survey related to: prevalence of asset 
classification system; period of arrears stipulated for classification of a loan as non-
performing; whether unrealized interest enters the income statement; upgradation of 
the loan classification; and minimum provisioning norms. 
4. Provisioning 
We consider select 3 questions of the survey related to: ratio of non-performing loans; 
ratio of specific provisions to gross non-performing loans, and ratio of general 
provisions to total gross loans for the analysis. 
5. Activities 
For this variable we study the responses of national supervisors for the select 3 
questions of the survey related to: can banks own voting shares in nonfinancial firms; 
single financial supervisory agency for all of the activities; and conditions for 
engaging in activities such as securities activities, insurance activities, real estate 
activities and non-financial firms. 
6. 
Protection to 
depositors 
We consider the responses of national supervisors for the select 2 questions of the 
survey related to:  percentage of the total deposits, the value of large denominated 
debt liabilities as a share of total assets for the analysis. 
7. 
Regulation 
of banking 
exposures 
Responses of select 7 questions of the survey related to: percent of the commercial 
banking system‘s assets in foreign-currency denomination; percent of the commercial 
banking system‘s liabilities in foreign-currency denomination; percent of the 
commercial banking system‘s assets in public sector claims; assets funded with 
deposits; exposure to real estate loans; exposure to commercial real estate loans; and 
percent of residential real estate loans that were securitized, were employed for the 
analysis of this variable 
8. 
Bank 
taxation 
Responses of select 2 questions of the survey related to: statutory corporate tax rate; 
and effective tax rate are considered for analysis of this variable. 
9. 
Bank 
performance 
For the analysis of this variable, we consider responses to select 4 questions of the 
survey related to: after-tax return on equity; percent of non-interest income in total 
gross income; aggregate operating costs to assets ratio; and ratio of non-performing 
loans 
10
. 
Bank 
supervision 
Under this variable we study the responses of national supervisors for the select 5 
questions of the survey related to: power of the supervisory agency to suspend the 
directors' decision to distribute bonuses, management fees; power of the national 
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supervisor to supervise insurance, securities and pension funds; single financial 
supervisory agency; and onsite examinations were considered. 
Note: Responses to the survey questions are obtained from the World Bank‘s Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS) 
database released in 2001, 2003, 2007 and 2012. 
 
Comparing responses between the aforesaid BRSS surveys and attributing the changes 
observed to the crisis can be debatable as we cannot be sure that the changes observed were indeed 
caused because of the crisis. However to probe the changes that were directly related to the crisis, the 
BRSS 2012 survey includes questions that explicitly request regulators to identify reforms introduced 
in response to the crisis. To determine whether there are significant differences in banking regulation 
and supervision in crisis versus non-crisis countries and during the crisis period, we conduct a series 
of mean t-tests on responses to distinct survey questions in BRSS. We perform multivariate 
regression analyses to understand the banking sector outcomes and regulation/supervision employing 
a wide range of bank regulation/supervision indicators. First, we use ordinary least squares 
regressions to observe the relationships between bank outcomes and bank regulation and supervision. 
In these regressions, we regress each of the two outcome variables (after-tax return on equity for the 
commercial banking system, and percent of the commercial banking system's total gross income that 
was in the form of non-interest income) on various supervisory and regulatory indicators. As La Porta 
et al., (1998) observe that legal origin helps account for cross-country differences in financial 
development; we include emerging markets origin dummy and BRICS dummy variables as 
exogenous control variables. The results of the detailed econometric analysis are presented in the 
ensuing section. 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Entry, structure and competition 
Economic literature offers differing views on the need for and the effect of regulations on 
entry into banking. While some argue that effective screening of bank entry can promote stability, 
others emphasize that banks with monopolistic power possess greater franchise value, which enhances 
prudent risk-taking behavior (Keeley, 1990). Others like, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) disagree, 
emphasizing the beneficial effects of competition and the harmful effects of entry regulation. Foreign 
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banks
5
 are believed to make bank-firm relationships more stable and by indirectly enhancing access to 
the financial system, foreign banks may benefit all firms (Giannetti and Ongena, 2012). Our approach 
enables us to explore whether there were significant restrictions on the entry of foreign and domestic 
banks that could explain the difference during the pre-crisis period and the crisis period. Table 3 
presents the subset of questions for which we observe statistical significant changes between the 2007 
and 2011-12 BRSS surveys. The table presents responses from the 2007 and 2011-12 surveys for 
crisis-countries (advanced as well as emerging countries), non-crisis countries (advanced as well as 
emerging countries) and BRICS countries. Furthermore, for each question, the table shows the p-
value from a test of differences in responses across the two surveys.  
 We observe from the paired samples mean‘t–test’ that there is no significant change in the 
number of commercial banks across the groups of countries under study. Similarly, we observe that 
there is no significant change in the percent of assets held by commercial banks, percent of total assets 
held by the five largest banks, and percent of total deposits held by the five largest banks. However, 
we notice significant change in the government ownership in the case of crisis-countries and BRICS 
countries. We observe significant change in assets of foreign banks in crisis-countries, non-crisis 
countries and BRICS countries. Foreign-owned bank assets were also found to have experienced 
significant change in the case of crisis (advanced) and crisis-countries.  
Table 3: Change in the banking structure during the crisis period   
 
Year 
Crisis – 
advanced 
countries 
average 
Crisis - 
emerging 
countries 
average 
Crisis-
countries 
average 
Non-crisis 
advanced 
countries 
average 
Non-crisis 
emerging 
countries 
average 
Non-crisis 
countries 
average 
BRICS 
countries 
average 
1. Number of commercial banks  
2007 
2010 
 
931 
872 
(0.18) 
580 
531 
(0.48) 
884 
826 
 (0.132) 
58 
59 
(0.456) 
77 
83 
(0.405) 
72 
77 
(0.374) 
313 
310 
(0.926) 
2. Percent of assets held by commercial banks  
2007 
2010 
 
97% 
97% 
(0.588) 
94% 
94% 
(0.500) 
97% 
97% 
(0.643) 
96% 
97% 
(0.578) 
90% 
90% 
(0.467) 
92% 
91% 
(0.533) 
95% 
96% 
(0.391) 
3. Percent of total assets held by the five largest banks 
2007 
2010 
 
68% 
68% 
(0.927) 
48% 
48% 
(0.778) 
65% 
65% 
(0.969) 
83% 
82% 
(0.748) 
61% 
62% 
(0.799) 
67% 
68% 
(0.911) 
62% 
62% 
(0.846) 
4. Percent of total deposits held by the five largest banks  
2007 
2010 
 
64% 
65% 
(0.510) 
57% 
56% 
(0.686) 
63% 
64% 
(0.564) 
85% 
85% 
(0.845) 
62% 
64% 
(0.318) 
68% 
67% 
(0.334) 
63% 
63% 
(0.940) 
                                                          
5 Khoury (1979) provide the empirical explanation for the multinationalization of the banking firm using the profit maximization hypothesis. 
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5. Percent of the banking system's assets that were government-controlled (e.g., where government owned 50% or 
more equity)  
2007 
2010 
 
7% 
11% 
(0.118) 
28% 
31% 
(0.175) 
10% 
14% 
(0.07) 
1% 
1% 
(0.423) 
28% 
27% 
(0.440) 
21% 
19% 
(0.372) 
37% 
40% 
(0.06) 
6. Percent of the banking system's assets that were foreign-controlled (e.g., where foreigners owned 50% or more 
equity)  
2007 
2010 
 
23% 
22% 
(0.116) 
43% 
40% 
(0.411) 
26% 
25% 
(0.05) 
56% 
54% 
(0.201) 
28% 
26% 
(0.221) 
34% 
33% 
(0.076) 
19% 
18% 
(0.046) 
7. Percent of the total foreign-owned bank assets in domestic banking system held in branches as opposed to other 
juridical forms (e.g. subsidiaries)  
2007 
2010 
 
28% 
30% 
(0.05) 
4% 
4% 
(0.50) 
22% 
24% 
(0.04) 
44% 
40% 
(0.296) 
16% 
16% 
(0.505) 
2008 
2010 
(0.272) 
23% 
22% 
(0.391) 
Note: We report the p-values of the paired samples t-test in the parenthesis and the bold figures indicate the levels of significance. 
 
We examine the changes in the applications accepted for commercial banking licenses from 
domestic entities. From the results reported in Table 4, we observe that there is no significant change 
either within the group of countries or between the pre-crisis period and the crisis period. 
Table 4: Regulatory impact on banking licenses  
 
Applications for commercial banking licenses from domestic entities: Accepted 
Year 2010 2007  
Crisis 
Non-Crisis 
 
20.6 
2.2 
(0.256) 
54.8 
1.73 
(0.17) 
 
Crisis 
BRICS 
20.6 
39.6 
(0.38) 
54.8 
111.4 
(0.54) 
 
Non-Crisis 
BRICS 
2.2 
39.6 
(0.383) 
1.73 
111.4 
(0.381) 
 
Applications for commercial banking licenses from domestic entities: Accepted – period 
comparison 
Year Crisis-countries Non-crisis countries BRICS countries 
2007 
2010 
 
54.8 
20.6 
(0.19) 
1.73 
2.2 
(0.73) 
111.4 
39.6 
(0.37) 
Note: We report the p-values of the paired samples t-test in the parenthesis. 
 
We examine the issue of entry of foreign banks by considering the response to the question – 
are foreign entities prohibited from entering through and present the results in Table 5. There is a 
significant change in the case of joint venture foreign entities among crisis and non-crisis countries. 
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Table 5: Regulatory impact on entry of foreign banks 
 
Are foreign entities prohibited from entering through: 
Year Acquisition Subsidiary Branch Joint Venture 
Crisis 
Non-Crisis 
 
0 
0 
(0) 
0 
0.13 
(0.164) 
0.667 
0.433 
(0.582) 
0 
0.266 
(0.041) 
Crisis 
BRICS 
0 
0 
(0) 
0 
0 
(0) 
0.667 
0.2 
(0.374) 
0 
0 
(0) 
Non-Crisis 
BRICS 
0 
0 
(0) 
0 
0 
(0) 
0.433 
0.2 
(0.374) 
0.266 
0 
(0.374) 
We report the p-values of the paired samples t-test in the parenthesis and the bold figures indicate the levels of significance. 
 
4.2 Capital regime 
Literature provides conflicting predictions as to whether the imposition of capital 
requirements will have positive effects (Santos, 2001; Gorton and Winton, 2003). Studies like Kim 
and Santomero (1988), Besanko and Kanatas (1996), and Blum (1999) claim that capital requirements 
might increase risk-taking behavior. In this study, we examine the regulatory impact on capital regime 
in the case of sample countries. We do not consider the relationships between capital regulations and 
banking performance in isolation. The results of the analysis presented in Table 6 explain that there 
was no significant change among the groups of countries during the periods of study in the case of 
minimum required risk-based regulatory capital ratio. However, there was a significant change in the 
case of actual risk based capital ratio of the banking system among crisis-countries, crisis (advanced) 
countries, and BRICS countries. We also observe a significant change in the case of actual tier-1 
capital ratio of the banking system among crisis-countries, crisis (advanced) countries and non-crisis 
(advanced) countries. The results indicate that there was substantial capitalisation of banks 
particularly in the crisis affected advanced countries and non-crisis advanced countries. In the case of 
BRICS countries actual risk based capital ratio experienced a substantial increase. These observations 
entail to believe that there was indeed a spillover effect of the crisis on the BRICS countries. In 
addition, there exists a scope to reason that BRICS countries took lessons from the crisis and geared 
up to strengthen their banking systems. 
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Table 6: Regulatory impact on capital regime 
 
Year 
Crisis – 
advanced 
countries 
Crisis - 
emerging 
countries 
Crisis-
countries 
Non-crisis 
advanced 
countries 
Non-crisis 
emerging 
countries 
Non-crisis 
countries 
 
BRICS 
countries 
 
1. Minimum required risk-based regulatory capital ratio 
2007 
2010 
 
0.817 
0.08 
(0.339) 
0.09 
0.04 
(0.5) 
0.077 
0.074 
(0.769) 
0.08 
0.05 
(0.423) 
0.092 
0.083 
(0.315) 
0.089 
0.077 
(0.155) 
0.096 
0.075 
(0.348) 
2. Actual risk based capital ratio of the banking system 
2007 
2010 
 
0.08 
0.13 
(0.01) 
0.152 
0.159 
(0.69) 
0.09 
0.14 
(0.01) 
0.11 
0.13 
(0.14) 
0.12 
0.14 
(0.32) 
0.12 
0.14 
(0.23) 
0.11 
0.15 
(0.06) 
3. Actual Tier 1 capital ratio of the banking system 
2007 
2010 
 
0.08 
0.11 
(0.001) 
0.123 
0.126 
(0.84) 
0.08 
0.11 
(0.001) 
0.08 
0.1 
(0.06) 
0.08 
0.11 
(0.18) 
0.08 
0.11 
(0.117) 
0.07 
0.09 
(0.4) 
Note: We report the p-values of the paired samples t-test in the parenthesis and the bold figures indicate the levels of significance. 
 
4.3 Asset classification norms 
In this section, with a subset of responses to five questions of BRSS survey, we examine the 
impact of regulation of asset classification norms among the group of countries during the pre-crisis 
and crisis periods. The provisioning stringency measures the degree to which a bank must make 
provision against a loan that is classified first as ―sub-standard‖, then as ―doubtful‖, and lastly as 
―loss‖. The results presented in Table 7 suggest that there is no significant change in the case of all the 
considered parameters related to asset classification in banks. These findings imply that though these 
norms were already in place before the crisis either their implementation was flawed or the 
supervisory agencies were not passionately enforcing them. 
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Table 7: Regulatory impact on asset classification norms 
 
Year 
Crisis – 
advanced 
countries 
Crisis - 
emerging 
countries 
Crisis-
countries 
Non-crisis 
advanced 
countries 
Non-crisis 
emerging 
countries 
Non-crisis 
countries 
 
BRICS 
countries 
 
1. Existence of an asset classification system under which banks have to report the quality of their loans 
and advances using a common regulatory scale 
2007 
2010 
 
0.61 
0.53 
(0.72) 
0.5 
0.5 
(1.0) 
0.6 
0.53 
(0.75) 
0.66 
0 
(0.18) 
0.91 
1 
(0.33) 
0.86 
0.8 
(0.58) 
0.8 
1.0 
(0.37) 
2. After how many days is a loan in arrears classified as non-performing as sub-standard asset? 
2007 
2010 
 
90 
60 
(0.5) 
30 
90 
-- 
70 
70 
(0.99) 
-- 
83 
29 
(0.134) 
83 
71 
(0.134) 
70 
65 
(0.423) 
3. Minimum provisioning required as loans become sub-standard assets 
2007 
2010 
 
0.23 
0.24 
(0.72) 
0.15 
0.2 
(0.5) 
0.15 
0.16 
(0.87) 
-- 
0.2 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.2 
0.22 
(0.79) 
0.16 
0.15 
(0.91) 
4. Minimum provisioning required as loans become doubtful assets 
2007 
2010 
 
0.65 
0.61 
(0.74) 
0.35 
0.5 
(0.5) 
0.53 
0.57 
(0.63) 
-- 
0.44 
0.45 
(0.82) 
0.44 
0.45 
(0.82) 
0.36 
0.35 
(0.94) 
5. Minimum provisioning required as loans become loss assets 
2007 
2010 
 
0.9 
1.0 
(0.39) 
-- 
1.0 
1.0 
-- 
-- 
0.95 
0.95 
-- 
0.93 
0.93 
-- 
1.0 
1.0 
-- 
Note: We report the p-values of the paired samples t-test in the parenthesis and the bold figures indicate the levels of significance. 
(--) indicates data not available or econometric result could not be obtained due to data inadequacy. 
 
4.4 Provisioning for bad and doubtful assets 
In this section, we assess the regulatory impact on the provisioning norms. The results 
presented in Table 8 that there was no significant change in the case of ratio of specific provisions to 
gross non-performing loans. However, significant change was observed in the case of ratio of general 
provisions among the non-crisis emerging countries. This leads to the inference that the non-crisis 
emerging countries took cue from the crisis and initiated required changes in the general provisioning 
for loans. 
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Table 8: Regulatory impact on provisioning for non-performing loans   
 
Year 
Crisis – 
advanced 
countries 
Crisis - 
emerging 
countries 
Crisis-
countries 
Non-crisis 
advanced 
countries 
Non-crisis 
emerging 
countries 
Non-crisis 
countries 
 
BRICS 
countries 
 
1. Ratio of non-performing loans (gross of provisions) to total gross loans 
2007 
2010 
 
0.033 
0.05 
(0.009) 
0.04 
0.08 
(0.09) 
0.03 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.008 
0.015 
(0.09) 
0.034 
0.029 
(0.14) 
0.028 
0.026 
(0.42) 
0.031 
0.041 
(0.35) 
2. Ratio of specific provisions to gross non-performing loans 
2007 
2010 
 
0.395 
0.393 
(0.95) 
0.98 
0.85 
(0.29) 
0.49 
0.47 
(0.49) 
0.28 
0.28 
(0.99) 
0.78 
0.87 
(0.16) 
0.66 
0.58 
(0.16) 
0.9 
0.96 
(0.66) 
3. Ratio of general provisions to total gross loans 
2007 
2010 
 
0.012 
0.013 
(0.64) 
-- 
0.011 
0.012 
(0.63) 
0.13 
0.17 
(0.41) 
0.009 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.04 
0.05 
(0.26) 
0.007 
0.008 
(0.33) 
Note: We report the p-values of the paired samples t-test in the parenthesis and the bold figures indicate the levels of significance. 
(--) indicates data not available or econometric result could not be obtained due to data inadequacy. 
 
 
4.5 Regulations on bank activities and banking-commerce 
In the richly available economic literature, Boyd et al., (1998) examine whether restricting 
bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce is associated with positive outcomes under 
specific conditions, and predict that restricting bank activities may reduce financial fragility in the 
presence of generous deposit insurance. We assess the extent of changes to measure the degree to 
which national regulatory authorities allow banks to engage in the following three fee-based rather 
than more traditional interest-spread-based activities: (i) Securities activities: the ability of banks to 
engage in the business of securities underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual 
fund industry. (i) Insurance activities: the ability of banks to engage in insurance underwriting and 
selling. (iii) Real estate activities: the ability of banks to engage in real estate investment, 
development, and management. The results presented in Table 9 suggest a significant change in the 
regulatory environment towards banks wholly owning nonfinancial firms during the crisis period in 
crisis and non-crisis countries as well except BRICS countries. While in the case of banks‘ foray into 
securities activities; we notice a significant change among non-crises (emerging) and BRICS 
countries, in the case of banks‘ foray into insurance activities; significant change is noticed only in 
non-crises (emerging) countries suggesting that there was a swift regulatory action in curbing/ceasing 
the banks from wholly owning nonfinancial firms particularly in advanced and emerging countries. 
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Likewise, emerging and BRICS countries too have taken measures in curbing/ceasing the banks from 
actively involving in securities activities. On the other hand, insurance activities by the banks in the 
emerging countries found a substantial increase. 
Table 9: Regulatory impact on activities by banking companies  
 
Year 
Crisis – 
advanced 
countries 
Crisis - 
emerging 
countries 
Crisis-
countries 
Non-crisis 
advanced 
countries 
Non-crisis 
emerging 
countries 
Non-crisis 
countries 
 
BRICS 
countries 
 
1. A bank may own 100% of the equity in any nonfinancial firm 
2007 
2010 
 
0.3 
0 
(0.04) 
-- 
0.33 
0 
(0.019) 
0 
0.33 
(0.423) 
0.166 
0.416 
(0.082) 
0.133 
0.4 
(0.041) 
0.2 
0.2 
(--) 
2. A bank may own 100% of the equity in a nonfinancial firm but ownership is limited based upon a 
bank's equity capital 
2007 
2010 
 
0.23 
0.38 
(0.337) 
0 
0.5 
(0.5) 
0.2 
0.4 
(0.189) 
0.33 
0.33 
(1.0) 
0.41 
0.5 
(0.674) 
0.166 
0.25 
(0.586) 
0.6 
0.4 
(0.621) 
3. A bank can only acquire less than 100% of the equity in any nonfinancial firm 
2007 
2010 
 
0.15 
0.07 
(0.409) 
0.1 
0.07 
(0.5) 
0.146 
0.078 
(0.382) 
0.433 
0.1 
(0.423) 
0.308 
0.139 
(0.129) 
0.198 
0.266 
(0.554) 
0.2 
0.49 
(0.191) 
4. When a bank can only acquire less than 100% of the equity in any nonfinancial firm, what can be the 
maximum percent which can be owned 
2007 
2010 
 
0.153 
0.079 
(0.409) 
0.1 
0.07 
(0.5) 
0.146 
0.078 
(0.381) 
0.433 
0.1 
(0.423) 
0.308 
0.139 
(0.129) 
0.198 
0.266 
(0.554) 
0.2 
0.49 
(0.191) 
5. A bank can engage in securities activities 
2007 
2010 
 
0.615 
0.3 
(0.165) 
1 
0 
(--) 
0.533 
0.266 
(0.164) 
1 
0.667 
(0.423) 
0.75 
0.25 
(0.007) 
0.533 
0.266 
(0.164) 
0.8 
0.2 
(0.07) 
6. A bank can engage in insurance activities 
2007 
2010 
 
0.307 
0.539 
(0.337) 
0.5 
0 
(0.5) 
0.266 
0.466 
(0.384) 
0.666 
0.666 
(--) 
0.416 
0.833 
(0.096) 
0.466 
0.8 
(0.136) 
0.6 
0.4 
(0.704) 
7. A bank can engage in real estate activities 
2007 
2010 
 
0.307 
0.154 
(0.436) 
0.5 
0.5 
(--) 
0.133 
0.2 
(0.582) 
0.666 
0 
(0.184) 
0.166 
0.5 
(0.104) 
0.133 
0.4 
(0.164) 
0.2 
0.4 
(0.374) 
Note: We report the p-values of the paired samples t-test in the parenthesis and the bold figures indicate the levels of significance. 
(--) indicates data not available or econometric result could not be obtained due to data inadequacy. 
 
4.6 Protection to depositors 
Deposit insurance/guarantee schemes politically are meant to prevent widespread bank runs. 
To protect payment and credit systems from contagious bank runs, many governments favor deposit 
insurance plus effective official oversight of banks to augment private sector monitoring of banks. 
Though they may encourage excessive risk-taking behavior, which some believe offsets any 
stabilization benefits. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) provide a detailed study on measuring 
the effects of the design of deposit insurance on bank fragility. Yet, many contend that regulation and 
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supervision can control the moral-hazard problem by designing an insurance scheme that 
encompasses appropriate coverage limits, scope of coverage, coinsurance, funding, premia structure, 
management and membership requirements. We present here the results of our assessment of the 
impact of regulatory environment on the depositor protection mechanisms during the pre-crisis and 
crisis period employing the response of the sample countries to the survey question – what percentage 
of the total deposits of participating commercial banks was actually covered by the scheme (Table 
10). We observe no significant change in the depositor protection/guarantee measures suggesting that 
crisis did not instigate substantial changes. 
Table 10: Regulatory impact on depositor protection schemes  
 
Year 
Crisis – 
advanced 
countries 
Crisis - 
emerging 
countries 
Crisis-
countries 
Non-crisis 
advanced 
countries 
Non-crisis 
emerging 
countries 
Non-crisis 
countries 
 
BRICS 
countries 
 
Coverage of total deposits of participating commercial banks under protection schemes 
2007 
2010 
 
0.494 
0.559 
(0.112) 
-- 
0.51 
0.56 
(0.164) 
-- 
0.457 
0.43 
(0.451) 
0.441 
0.423 
(0.553) 
0.516 
0.44 
(0.404) 
Note: We report the p-values of the paired samples t-test in the parenthesis. (--) indicates data not available or econometric result 
could not be obtained due to data inadequacy. 
 
 
4.7 Regulation of banking exposures 
In this section, we consider a subset of responses to select seven questions in the BRSS 
survey related to regulatory rules or supervisory guidelines regarding requirements for the 
management of foreign currencies, exposures of banking assets and liabilities in foreign-currency 
denomination, exposure of banking assets in commercial and residential real estate and their 
securitisation for liquidity requirements. The results of the analysis are furnished in Table 11. We 
notice that foreign-currency denominated assets drastically reduced during the crisis period among the 
crisis, non-crisis, and non-crisis (emerging) countries. The foreign-currency liabilities shrunk 
drastically among the crisis (advanced) and non-crisis countries. Public sector claims sharply swelled 
only among the crisis (advanced) and crisis-countries suggesting that governments lent substantially 
to bail out these banks. Though the bank assets in residential real estate loans swelled in the crisis-
countries, there was no significant change in commercial real estate loans. We do not find any 
significant change in the securitisation of residential real estate loans among all the groups of study 
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sample. One interesting observation in this section of the analysis is that BRICS countries did not 
experience any substantial change suggesting that there were no significant regulatory/supervisory 
measures initiated by these countries during the crisis period. These results suggest that these severe 
imbalances were caused necessarily due to the severe liquidity and credit crunch, seemed to be 
confined more or less to financial markets and institutions in the United States and Western Europe 
and also due to the absence of proper mechanisms to address such situations or failure of regulatory 
apparatus.  
Table 11: Regulatory impact on banking exposures  
 
Year 
Crisis – 
advanced 
countries 
Crisis - 
emerging 
countries 
Crisis-
countries 
Non-crisis 
advanced 
countries 
Non-crisis 
emerging 
countries 
Non-crisis 
countries 
 
BRICS 
countries 
 
1. Percent of the commercial banking system‘s assets that was foreign-currency denominated 
2007 
2010 
 
0.183 
0.166 
(0.13) 
0.306 
0.252 
(0.31) 
0.205 
0.182 
(0.041) 
0.031 
0.049 
(0.262) 
0.156 
0.133 
(0.02) 
0.136 
0.115 
(0.007) 
0.132 
0.099 
(0.187) 
2. Percent of the commercial banking system‘s liabilities that was foreign-currency denominated 
2007 
2010 
 
0.210 
0.185 
(0.006) 
0.241 
0.213 
(0.476) 
0.216 
0.190 
(0.476) 
0.235 
0.226 
(0.76) 
0.147 
0.124 
(0.101) 
0.163 
0.142 
(0.083) 
0.121 
0.089 
(0.137) 
3. Percent of the commercial banking system‘s assets that was in public sector claims 
2007 
2010 
 
0.058 
0.086 
(0.003) 
0.016 
0.034 
(0.419) 
0.050 
0.076 
(0.001) 
0.006 
0.018 
(0.376) 
0.165 
0.202 
(0.284) 
0.129 
0.159 
(0.236) 
0.246 
0.239 
(0.792) 
4. Percent of the commercial banking system‘s assets that was funded with deposits 
2007 
2010 
 
0.508 
0.521 
(0.323) 
0.430 
0.500 
(0.115) 
0.498 
0.518 
(0.108) 
0.493 
0.535 
(0.106) 
0.671 
0.674 
(0.67) 
0.627 
0.639 
(0.353) 
0.589 
0.608 
(0.611) 
5. Percent of total bank assets that were residential real estate loans 
2007 
2010 
 
0.159 
0.174 
(0.109) 
0.116 
0.135 
(0.587) 
0.151 
0.166 
(0.058) 
0.294 
0.344 
(0.148) 
0.074 
0.075 
(0.752) 
0.119 
0.132 
(0.141) 
0.069 
0.077 
(0.126) 
6. Percentage of total bank assets that were commercial real estate loans 
2007 
2010 
 
0.054 
0.05 
(0.216) 
-- 
0.048 
0.044 
(0.205) 
0.050 
0.049 
(0.749) 
0.026 
0.026 
(0.993) 
0.032 
0.032 
(0.823) 
0.034 
0.039 
(0.249) 
7. Percentage of residential real estate loans that were securitized 
2007 
2010 
 
0.236 
0.243 
(0.851) 
-- 
0.236 
0.243 
(0.851) 
0.125 
0.113 
(0.644) 
0.027 
0.023 
(0.418) 
0.060 
0.053 
(0.368) 
0.008 
0.009 
(0.717) 
Note: We report the p-values of the paired samples t-test in the parenthesis and the bold figures indicate the levels of significance. 
(--) indicates data not available or econometric result could not be obtained due to data inadequacy. 
 
4.8 Bank taxation 
The regulatory literature ‗taxation‘, except in the shape of deposit insurance, justified 
primarily as a defense against bank runs—has played no significant role. Some of the literature refers 
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to capital regulation as a price-based instrument, since it effectively raises the shadow value of capital. 
While IMF (2010) offers an extensive review of the comparison between taxation and regulation in 
the financial sector, Shackelford et al., (2010) discuss aspects of financial sector taxation in light of 
the crisis. In the backdrop of trying to understand whether there is a merit in the dominance of the 
regulatory approach to dealing with financial sector externalities warranted, or is there a more 
purposive role in this area for corrective taxation, the purpose of this section is to know whether there 
existed a significant change during the crisis period. In this section, we present the results of our 
assessment of a subset of responses to two specific questions related to statutory corporate tax and 
effective tax rate on the banking system (Table 12). We notice no significant change in either the 
statutory corporate tax rate or effective tax rate on the bank income. 
Table–12: Regulatory impact on taxing the banking corporations  
 
Year 
Crisis – 
advanced 
countries 
Crisis - 
emerging 
countries 
Crisis-
countries 
Non-crisis 
advanced 
countries 
Non-crisis 
emerging 
countries 
Non-crisis 
countries 
 
BRICS 
countries 
 
1. Statutory corporate tax rate on domestic bank income 
2007 
2010 
 
0.266 
0.251 
(0.183) 
0.215 
0.195 
(0.5) 
0.258 
0.242 
(0.111) 
0.315 
0.3 
(0.5) 
0.258 
0.296 
(0.579) 
0.285 
0.296 
(0.654) 
0.242 
0.3 
(0.609) 
2. Effective tax rate on the aggregate commercial banking system's pre-tax income 
2007 
2010 
 
0.263 
0.173 
(0.140) 
-- 
0.263 
0.173 
(0.14) 
0.275 
0.285 
(0.793) 
0.279 
0.243 
(0.352) 
0.278 
0.254 
(0.402) 
0.243 
0.293 
(0.520) 
Note: We report the p-values of the paired samples t-test in the parenthesis. (--) indicates data not available or econometric result 
could not be obtained due to data inadequacy. 
 
4.9 Banking performance 
Banks are costly and difficult to monitor. Some theoretical model suggest that strong, official 
supervision under such circumstances can help prevent banks from engaging in excessive risk-taking 
behavior and thus improve bank development, performance and stability. Contrary view is that 
powerful supervisors may exert a negative influence on bank performance as they may use their 
powers to benefit favored constituents, attract campaign donations, and extract bribes (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1998; Djankov et al., 2002). Another strand of literature views that countries with more open, 
private-sector-oriented approaches to regulation and supervision tend to have greater bank 
development, better performance and more stable banks. The aim of this section is to assess the 
impact of regulatory environment on the performance of banking systems. The regulatory literature is 
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not rich on the rigorous assessment of which specific regulatory and supervisory standards actually 
matter for bank performance and stability. Regulatory agencies around the world would greatly 
benefit from systematic evidence on the relationship between bank performance and regulatory and 
supervisory systems. The results of our assessment presented in Table 13 suggest that aggregate 
operating costs experienced significant change only in the non-crisis emerging countries. Obviously, 
as is widely known, the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans experienced a significant 
change among the crisis, advanced as well as emerging among the crisis-countries, and the non-crisis 
(advanced) countries. 
Table 13: Regulatory impact on banking performance  
 
Year 
Crisis – 
advanced 
countries 
Crisis - 
emerging 
countries 
Crisis-
countries 
Non-crisis 
advanced 
countries 
Non-crisis 
emerging 
countries 
Non-crisis 
countries 
 
BRICS 
countries 
 
1. After-tax return on equity for the commercial banking system 
2007 
2010 
 
-0.083 
0.031 
(0.413) 
0.103 
0.107 
(0.795) 
-0.058 
0.041 
(0.408) 
0.131 
0.122 
(0.691) 
0.134 
0.131 
(0.90) 
0.133 
0.13 
(0.806) 
0.175 
0.153 
(0.117) 
2. Percent of the commercial banking system's total gross income that was in the form of non-interest 
income 
2007 
2010 
 
0.254 
0.326 
(0.338) 
0.479 
0.480 
(0.99) 
0.256 
0.347 
(0.336) 
0.285 
0.292 
(0.874) 
0.315 
0.322 
(0.691) 
0.308 
0.314 
(0.698) 
0.399 
0.376 
(0.382) 
3. Aggregate operating costs to assets ratio for the commercial banking system 
2007 
2010 
 
0.016 
0.015 
(0.454) 
-- 
0.017 
0.016 
(0.389) 
0.015 
0.0156 
(0.456) 
0.036 
0.038 
(0.079) 
0.031 
0.032 
(0.623) 
0.0273 
0.0271 
(0.93) 
4. Ratio of non-performing loans (gross of provisions) to total gross loans 
2007 
2010 
 
0.033 
0.064 
(0.001) 
0.043 
0.081 
(0.099) 
0.034 
0.066 
(0.000) 
0.008 
0.015 
(0.096) 
0.034 
0.03 
(0.201) 
0.028 
0.026 
(0.423) 
0.031 
0.041 
(0.351) 
Note: We report the p-values of the paired samples t-test in the parenthesis and the bold figures indicate the levels of significance. 
(--) indicates data not available or econometric result could not be obtained due to data inadequacy. 
 
4.10 Banking supervision 
Literature on the overall role of the government in regulating economic activity dates back to 
Pigouvian period (Pigou, 1938). Arguments in favor of government intervention such as: the existence 
of monopoly power, externalities, and informational asymmetries that are Pigouvian create a 
potentially constructive role for government interventions to offset these market failures and enhance 
social welfare. However, others such as Shleifer and Vishny (1998) dispute that governments act in 
their own interests and frequently do not ameliorate market failures. Irrespective of the theoretical 
debates, countries in practice assign very different priorities to bank supervision. In this backdrop, the 
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aim of this section is to know was there a significant change during the crisis period in the supervisory 
environment of the groups of countries in the study sample. Considering a subset of responses for two 
important questions of the survey, we assess the impact of the change. The results presented in Table 
14 suggest that the power of supervisory agencies to control dividend distribution strengthened 
substantially in the crisis-countries only. However, onsite examinations drastically increased in the 
non-crisis countries more vigorously than in the crisis-countries. Interestingly the results suggest that 
BRICS countries did not undergo any substantial supervisory transformation in this regard. 
Table 14: Changes in banking supervision  
 
Year 
Crisis – 
advanced 
countries 
Crisis - 
emerging 
countries 
Crisis-
countries 
Non-crisis 
advanced 
countries 
Non-crisis 
emerging 
countries 
Non-crisis 
countries 
 
BRICS 
countries 
 
1. Power of supervisory agencies to suspend the directors‘ decision to distribute dividends 
2007 
2010 
 
0.416 
0.750 
(0.039) 
-- 
0.357 
0.787 
(0.008) 
-- 
0.75 
0.833 
(0.339) 
0.733 
0.800 
(0.334) 
0.6 
0.8 
(0.374) 
2. Onsite examinations per bank that were performed in the last 5 years 
2007 
2010 
 
2.667 
2.945 
(0.840) 
-- 
0.237 
0.266 
(0.798) 
0.475 
0.8 
(0.314) 
0.265 
5.687 
(0.156) 
3.05 
6.15 
(0.076) 
2.667 
9.333 
(2.92) 
Note: We report the p-values of the paired samples t-test in the parenthesis and the bold figures indicate the levels of significance. 
(--) indicates data not available or econometric result could not be obtained due to data inadequacy. 
 
 
4.11 Regulatory impact during the crisis period  
The purpose of this section is to examine the relationship between the bank regulation and 
supervision variables and the bank performance outcomes. We use ordinary least squares regressions 
to examine the relationships between bank performance outcomes (viz. after-tax return and non-
interest income) and bank regulation and supervision variables detailed in Table 15. Our approach is 
to examine the aforesaid relationship for the period 2007, 2010 and the crisis period (2007-10). While 
the multivariate regression analysis for the period 2007 provides the pre-crisis scenario, the analysis 
for 2010 is believed to present the post crisis scenario. The analysis for the crisis period provides the 
relationship during the crisis scenario. In order to elicit the relationship in the case of BRICS countries 
and emerging countries we introduce dummies d1 and d2 respectively. 
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Table 15: Bank regulation/supervision variables  
 Variables Symbol 
1 
Existence of an asset classification system under which banks have to report the 
quality of their loans and advances using a common regulatory scale 
acs 
2 Actual risk based capital ratio of the banking system arbcar 
3 Percent of assets held by commercial banks  asset 
4 Percent of total assets held by the five largest banks atfb 
5 After-tax return on equity for the commercial banking system atr 
6 Applications for commercial banking licenses from domestic entities: Accepted bl 
7 Minimum required risk-based regulatory capital ratio car 
8 
Coverage of total deposits of participating commercial banks under 
protection/guarantee schemes 
dg 
9 
Power of supervisory agencies to suspend the directors‘ decision to distribute 
dividends 
div 
10 Effective tax rate on the aggregate commercial banking system's pre-tax income etr 
11 
Percent of the total foreign-owned bank assets in domestic banking system held in 
branches as opposed to other juridical forms (e.g. subsidiaries)  
fba 
12 
Percent of the commercial banking system‘s liabilities that was foreign-currency 
denominated 
fcl 
13 Ratio of general provisions to total gross loans gpr 
14 A bank can engage in insurance activities ins 
15 A bank may own 100% of the equity in any nonfinancial firm nff 
16 
Percent of the commercial banking system's total gross income that was in the form of 
non-interest income 
nii 
17 Ratio of non-performing loans (gross of provisions) to total gross loans npl 
18 Aggregate operating costs to assets ratio for the commercial banking system oc 
19 Onsite examinations per bank that were performed in the last 5 years osi 
20 Minimum provisioning required as loans become Sub Standard Assets pssa 
21 A bank can engage in real estate activities reest 
22 Percent of total bank assets that were residential real estate loans rer 
23 Percentage of residential real estate loans that were securitized rers 
24 Statutory corporate tax rate on domestic bank income sct 
25 A bank can engage in securities activities sec 
26 Ratio of specific provisions to gross non-performing loans spr 
27 Actual Tier 1 capital ratio of the banking system t1car 
 
We believe there are two methodological limitations to this analysis. One is that we conduct 
pure cross-country regressions because information on regulations and supervisory practices is 
available at particular points of time. The problem with this approach is that it is challenging to 
control fully for potential simultaneity bias as banking-sector outcomes may influence regulations and 
supervisory practices. The other limitation is that only aggregate measures of bank performance as 
available in the BRSS are used. However, our cross-country study provides a unique assessment of 
the relationships between banking systems‘ performance and the regulation/supervision of banks of 
select geo-financially important 30 countries (including advanced and emerging) around the world. 
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The results of the multivariate regression analysis for the period 2007 are presented in Table 
16. We observe that actual risk based capital ratio is significant at 0.05 level of confidence in all the 
three models in the case of dependent variable – non-interest income and at 0.10 level in the case of 
dependent variable – after-tax return, which indicates that actual risk based capital ratio with an 
average of 12.91 percent had a considerable impact on profitability by compelling the banks to push 
up their non-interest income. This finding contributes to the theory that increasing capital adequacy 
ratio has an adverse impact on the profitability of the banks. On the contrary, it had a negative impact 
on the after-tax return of the banks as indicated by the observed negative sign of the coefficient. 
Foreign-currency denominated liabilities significantly impacted with a negative effect on the non-
interest income. The significant positive relationship of assets held by the top five largest banks with 
the non-interest income establishes that top five banks in the banking systems were actively engaged 
in increasing their fee-based services in order to boost their profitability. On the expected lines, 
residential real estate loans were found to be negatively impacting on non-interest income expounding 
that increasing exposure to such loans was not contributing to the profitability of the banking systems. 
Taxation and deposit protection/guarantee schemes were significant but negatively impacting on after-
tax return, which indicates that increasing taxation and deposit guarantee fees on the banks were 
adversely impacting on bank profitability. Another intriguing observation is that onsite inspections by 
the supervisor/s were negatively impacting on bank profitability, which reveals that banks were either 
not accurate or unfair in collecting their income. 
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Table 16:  Banking systems‘ performance and regulation/supervision – 2007  
 Dependent Variable: atr Dependent Variable: nii 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 
arbcar 
-1.273* -0.234 -2.249 3.853** 3.496** 5.038** 
( 8.303) (-0.118) (-0.830) (2.511) (2.332) (2.343) 
atfb 
0.045 -0.055 0.187 0.627 0.656** 0.471 
(1.752) (-0.195) (0.496) (2.435) 2.640 (1.353) 
fba 
 0.064 0.075 0.133 0.176 0.101 
 (0.153) (0.200) (0.707) (0.959) (0.457) 
fcl 
 -0.063 0.376 -0.445 -0.346 -0.641* 
 (-0.138) (0.596) (-2.067) (-1.572) (-1.967) 
osi 
-0.042** 0.003 0.003 -0.014 -0.013 -0.018 
(-12.711) (0.127) (0.151) (-0.619) (-0.604) (-0.729) 
rer 
0.265 0.114 -0.144 -0.749 -0.787* -0.654 
(6.156) (0.130) (-0.170) (0.117) (-0.890) (-1.293) 
etr 
-0.958** -0.157 -0.526    
(-15.784) (-0.209) (-0.748)    
npl 
-0.974 0.310 -0.869    
(-6.322) (0.307) (-0.746)    
dg 
0.258**      
( 12.662)      
sec 
     0.004 
     (0.047) 
d1 
 0.062   0.094  
 (0.850)   (1.322)  
d2 
  0.167   0.004 
  (1.067)   (-0.864) 
Intercept 
0.534** 0.181 0.302 -0.380 -0.405 0.331 
(22.30) (0.369) (0.709) (-1.551) (-1.715) (-1.172) 
Adj. R-squared 0.98 0.641 0.711 0.478 0.518 0.394 
Note: We report the coefficients of regression and t-statistics in parenthesis ( ) using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors from an OLS regression. The levels of significance are indicated as * for 0.10 level, ** for 0.05 level and *** for 
0.01 level. Each column represents one regression and the 2nd and 3rd columns in both the dependent variables regressions 
include dummy variables viz. d1 for BRICS countries and d2 for emerging countries. 
 
We present the results of the multivariate regression analysis for the period 2010 in Table 17. 
Interestingly, existence of an asset classification system was negative impacting on after-tax return 
implying that banks were either inaccurate in implementing the income collection activities or asset 
classification norms were too taxing on their profitability. We need to note that during 2010 too, the 
significant positive relationship of assets held by the top five largest banks with the non-interest 
income confirms that top five banks in the banking systems are vigorously engaged in expanding their 
fee-based services to boost their profitability. Actual risk based capital ratio being found positively 
significant only in BRICS countries confirms the hypothesis of positive link between capital 
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requirements and bank profitability particularly during the post-crisis period. Power of supervisors to 
control dividend distribution is found to have adverse impact on bank profitability suggesting that 
supervisory agencies have, obligated by the crisis period experience, vigorously exercised their 
powers in regulating the bank directors‘ powers to distribute dividends. Further, this analysis verifies 
that there was a substantial reduction in taxation on the commercial banking systems resulting in 
significant positive impact on their profitability (also see Table 12). General provisions to gross loans 
is found to have significant negative impact on the profitability implying that provisioning norms 
were strengthened and passionately implemented by the banks backed by the learning from the crisis 
experience. Residential real estate loans are positively impacting on the profitability explaining that 
increasing exposure to such loans was now contributing to bank profitability. However, the 
securitisation of these loans had a substantial adverse effect on profitability. Engaging in securities 
activities for the banks is found to have positive effect on profitability implying that post crisis period 
banks have regained their hold on the securities business. 
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Table 17:  Banking systems‘ performance and regulation/supervision – 2010  
 Dependent Variable: atr Dependent Variable: nii 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 
acs 
-0.063* -0.063 -0.051*    
(-1.812) (-2.089) (-1.974)    
arbcar 
0.312 0.697* 0.361    
(0.935) (1.909) (1.236)    
atfb 
   0.255** 0.253** 0.113 
   (0.388) (2.227) (0.629) 
bl 
   0.081 0.081  
   (0.075) (0.015)  
dg 
   0.132* 0.121 0.102 
   (1.817) (1.518) (1.307) 
div 
 0.072  -0.098* -0.108 -0.102* 
 (1.585)  -1.819 (-1.772) (-1.876) 
etr 
0.478*** 0.172 0.336*** 0.662*** 0.738** 0.839*** 
(3.445) (1.177) (3.592) (3.316) (2.653) (3.139) 
fcl 
   0.199 0.143 0.190 
   (0.763) (0.467) (0.727) 
gpr 
-0.150   -1.272*** -1.291*** -1.394** 
(1.032)   (-3.747) (-3.611) (-3.863) 
ins 
0.038 0.081 0.034    
(1.158) (2.221) (1.270)    
nff 
0.003   -0.033 -0.032 0.027 
(0.108)   (-0.641) (-0.595) (0.335) 
osi 
0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 
(0.466) (-0.988) (-0.197) (-0.935) (-0.252) (0.335) 
reest 
0.032      
(0.829)      
rer 
   0.722* 0.746 0.788** 
   (2.446) (2.378) (2.604) 
rers 
-0.284** 0.128 -0.138 -0.633** -0.764 -0.897** 
(-2.196) (0.496) -1.181 (-2.371) (-1.809) (-2.387) 
sec 
0.024 0.013 0.022 0.157** 0.148* 0.158** 
(0.705) (0.417) (0.746) (2.461) (2.143) (2.489) 
spr 
0.014 0.026 0.026    
(0.446) (0.930) (1.005)    
d1 
 0.118   -0.052  
 (1.680)   (-0.412)  
d2 
  0.042   -0.106 
  (1.636)   (-0.998) 
Intercept 
-0.022 -0.110 -0.030 0.041 0.045 0.147 
(-0.434) (-1.576) (-0.683) (0.593) (0.612) (1.159) 
Adj. R-squared 0.441 0.496 0.548 0.658 0.627 0.657 
Note: We report the coefficients of regression, standard errors in italic and t-statistics in parenthesis ( ) using 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from an OLS regression. The levels of significance are indicated as * for 0.10 
level, ** for 0.05 level and *** for 0.01 level. Each column represents one regression and the 2nd and 3rd columns in both 
the dependent variables regressions include dummy variables viz. d1 for BRICS countries and d2 for emerging countries. 
 
We now present the results of the multivariate regression analysis for the crisis period in Table 
18. On expected lines, non-performing loans and banks‘ real estate activities are found to have a 
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substantial negative impact on profitability. However, securitisation of residential reals estate loans is 
found to have a significant positive impact, which implies that during the crisis period the banks 
managed their incomes by securitizing major chunks of their residential real estate loans. 
Interestingly, we notice that foreign bank assets have had a positive effect on bank profitability. It 
reveals that during the crisis period most of the banks gained their incomes from foreign banking 
activity as their domestic financial systems were crisis ridden. One important observation is that 
BRICS banking systems too experienced negative impact during the crisis period as we find the 
dummy variable negatively significant at 0.10 level. On the other hand, though emerging economy 
banking systems too had a negative impact during the crisis period, the impact was found to be 
insignificant. 
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 Table 18:  Banking systems‘ performance and regulation/supervision – Crisis period 
 Dependent Variable: atr            Dependent Variable: nii 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 
arbcar 
1.680 4.938** 3.198 -0.877 0.987 -1.228 
(0.810) (2.436) (1.607) (-0.738) (-0.651) -0.946 
nff 
-0.233** -0.138 -0.100 -0.095 -0.098 -0.126 
(-2.556) (-1.706) (-1.012) (-1.652) (-1.507) (-1.705) 
acs 
    0.034 0.034 
    (0.620) (0.650) 
npl 
-7.047*** -7.252*** -8.517***    
(-3.191) (-3.523) (-3.544)    
osi 
-0.020 -0.016 -0.022*    
(-1.617) (-0.208) (-1.733)    
reest 
-0.156* -0.165** -0.155 0.029 0.023 0.017 
(-1.802) (-1.949) (-1.678) (0.615) (0.442) (0.325) 
rer 
6.562*** 5.332*** 5.168**  2.750* 3.014** 
(2.887) (2.659) (2.268)  (1.916) (2.025) 
rers 
  -0.672 2.349*** 2.347*** 2.426*** 
  (-0.402) (2.988) (2.853) (2.948) 
atfb 
-0.820      
(-0.541)      
div 
0.033      
(0.315)      
etr 
   0.268 0.239 0.241 
   (1.453) (1.180) (1.241) 
fba 
4.084*   2.814** 2.763** 2.979** 
(1.813)   (2.238) (2.043) 2.230 
fcl 
-4.318**  -5.694*** 1.899*  2.256* 
(-2.347)  (-2.897) (1.783)  (1.910) 
gpr 
-5.530 -5.862** -6.858**    
(-1.952) (-2.212) (-2.041)    
ins 
   -0.031 -0.027 -0.026 
   (-0.891) (-0.697) (-0.713) 
sec 
   0.041 0.030 0.043 
   (0.834) (0.511) (0.770) 
d1 
 -0.233*   -0.010  
 (-1.916)   (-0.110)  
d2 
  -0.132   0.040 
  (-0.402)   (0.600) 
Intercept 
0.082 0.004 0.095 0.089* 0.089 0.081 
0.896 (0.048) (0.864) (1.749) (1.630) (1.459) 
Adj. R-squared 0.509 0.531 0.454 0.320 0.256 0.271 
Note: We report the coefficients of regression, standard errors in italic and t-statistics in parenthesis ( ) using 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from an OLS regression. The levels of significance are indicated as * for 0.10 
level, ** for 0.05 level and *** for 0.01 level. Each column represents one regression and the 2nd and 3rd columns in both 
the dependent variables regressions include dummy variables viz. d1 for BRICS countries and d2 for emerging countries. 
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To sum up, in terms of structure, while government ownership of banks has surged during the 
crisis period in the crisis and BRICS countries, there was substantial decrease in assets of foreign 
banks in the crisis, non-crisis and BRICS countries. However, foreign-owned bank assets were found 
to have substantially increased in only in the crisis-countries. There was substantial capitalisation of 
banks not only in the advanced countries of the crisis and non-crisis groups but also in BRICS 
countries which entails to believe that there was indeed a spillover effect of the crisis on the BRICS 
countries. Therefore, there exists a scope to reason that BRICS countries took lessons from the crisis 
and geared up to strengthen their banking systems. This study perceives that though these asset 
classification norms were already in place before the crisis either their implementation was flawed or 
the supervisory agencies were not passionately enforcing them. General provisions against loans 
drastically went up in the non-crisis emerging countries leading us to conclude that these countries 
have taken cue from the crisis and initiated required changes to place necessary firewalls against bank 
failures. 
 During the crisis period, swift regulatory action is felt in curbing/ceasing the banks from 
wholly owning nonfinancial firms, particularly in advanced and emerging countries. Likewise 
emerging and BRICS countries too have taken measures in curbing/ceasing the banks from actively 
involving in securities activities. On the other hand, insurance activities by the banks in the emerging 
countries found a substantial increase during the crisis period. We find no significant change in the 
depositor protection/guarantee measures suggesting that crisis did not instigate substantial changes in 
this direction. Public sector claims sharply swelled only among the crisis (advanced) and crisis-
countries suggesting that governments lent substantially to bail out these banks. Further, the foreign-
currency denominated assets drastically reduced and the foreign-currency liabilities shrunk 
considerably, suggesting that though these awful imbalances were caused necessarily due to the 
severe liquidity and credit crunch, seemed to be confined more or less to financial markets and 
institutions in the United States and Western Europe, but then were aggravated due to the absence of 
proper mechanisms to address such situations or failure of regulatory apparatus. While the 
supervisory powers to control dividend distribution strengthened substantially in the crisis-countries 
only, onsite examinations considerably bettered in the non-crisis countries more vigorously than in the 
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crisis-countries. Interestingly the results suggest that BRICS countries did not undergo any substantial 
supervisory transformation in this regard. 
 In terms of the stringency of capital adequacy norms, there exists a positive link between 
capital requirements and bank performance during the crisis period. Non-performing loans and banks‘ 
real estate activities have substantially cut down bank profitability. Securitisation of residential real 
estate loans helped banks to manage awful liquidity needs. Interestingly, foreign bank assets have had 
a positive effect on bank profitability as most of these banks gained their incomes from foreign 
banking activity as their domestic financial systems were crisis ridden.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Our results offer interesting insights about the bank regulatory/supervisory styles and 
illustrate the differences in regulation between crisis, non-crisis and BRICS countries and highlight 
the ways in which bank regulation and supervision has changed during the crisis period. Drawing on 
the analysis, we conclude that though the financial crisis was an outcome of mis-governance as well 
as market failure. The world experienced different styles of regulatory/supervisory styles in dealing 
with the crisis. Banks in crisis-countries faced fewer restrictions to engage in non-bank activities such 
as insurance, investment banking and real estate activities compared to non-crisis countries. Crisis-
countries were not only laidback in the treatment of bad loans and loan losses; they were deficient in 
regulating the capital requirements, constituting greater provisions or in suspending bonuses or 
withholding management fees. Even though crisis-countries had robust information disclosure 
requirements, the incentives for the private sector to monitor banks‘ risks were weaker and hence 
could aid in better risk management. On the contrary, emerging economies did fare better, partly 
because of structural reasons and partly because their policies worked in their favor. The soundness of 
domestic financial sectors also improved in emerging countries mostly due to better regulation and 
supervision, more prudent practices by financial intermediaries, and abundant local liquidity. Perhaps 
for the first time in recent decades, the domestic financial systems of many emerging countries did not 
amplify the shocks from the crisis. The analysis nevertheless suggests that crisis-countries had weaker 
regulatory and supervisory frameworks compared to those in emerging countries during the crisis. 
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BRICS countries as a distinct block has demonstrated uniqueness in the regulatory/supervisory styles 
which is neither similar to crisis-countries nor with the non-crisis countries. Their regulatory practices 
have greatly evolved and hence could sustain the onslaught of the crisis remarkably with relatively 
lesser damage and faster recovery.  
Overall, the regulatory/supervisory styles are evolving. There have not been swift changes 
only due to the crisis except some noteworthy developments particularly in the area of capital 
adequacy, asset classification approaches, controlling the managements in dividend distribution and 
management fees, and allowing banks in taking up related activities like owning nonfinancial firms, 
dealing in securities and insurance businesses etc. Although these changes are encouraging, there still 
is the scope for further reforming the regulatory and supervisory structures as well as policies and 
practices. 
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